





Public policy towards patents has assumed a robust positive relationship between
the strength of patent protection and the level of innovative research effort even
though economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the impact of
patents on research varies considerably by industry.This classroom experiment
provides students with an introduction to two competing models of the impact of
patents on R&D:the ‘winner-take-all’model contains incentives for excessive
research effort and the ‘knowledge spillover’model contains incentives for free
riding.Class discussion explores potential changes to current patent policy and
policy alternatives for stimulating R&D.
Introduction
Growth theory asserts that an economy’s long run rate of economic growth is strongly
related to its rate of productivity growth.Productivity growth,in turn,is determined in
part by innovation and technological progress.Thus,governments interested in
promoting long run economic growth choose policies that encourage innovation.
Granting patents to innovators has long been assumed to be one important part of
the policy menu.However,economic theory and empirical evidence indicate that
patent protection does not always provide incentives for optimal levels of research
and development.Patent law,industry structure and externalities associated with
knowledge may result in too much or too little research effort.
This paper describes a classroom experiment that allows students to determine
research effort in response to two different incentive structures:a ‘winner-take-all’
system and one in which there are extensive knowledge externalities.In the
‘winner-take-all’structure,ﬁrms typically engage in too much duplicative research and
the total research expenditures exceed the ﬁnancial rewards from the patent.In the
externalities structure,ﬁrms are tempted to free ride on the research efforts of others
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may build on the discovery),patent holders are granted monopoly rights to the use
of the innovation for a ﬁxed period of time.The size of the welfare loss varies with
both the length and breadth of the patent.A patent can confer broad protections – to
prevent the use of closely related innovations without the permission of the patent
holder – or narrow protections,which allow for a greater degree of ‘me-too’
inventions.As long as length and breadth are carefully chosen,the welfare loss from
monopoly pricing and output levels can be smaller than the gains from higher levels
of innovation.Policy choices are complicated by the fact that knowledge has the
characteristics of a public good.It is non-rival in use and can be largely
non-excludable,particularly in the absence of intellectual property protection.
Although societies beneﬁt from a wide dissemination of knowledge,ﬁrms that ﬁrst
produce knowledge may ﬁnd it difficult to fully appropriate the beneﬁts of it,as other
ﬁrms copy their advances and compete against them in the marketplace.
Patents are an imperfect means of achieving the twin goals of increased research
and the dissemination of knowledge.As Kenneth Arrow (1962) noted,‘No amount
of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropriable commodity out of
something so intangible as information.’Thus,Arrow predicted a downward bias in
inventive activity,particularly for basic research.Conversely,to the extent that a ﬁrm
is able to appropriate the use of its research,Arrow argued that the information
itself would be underutilised.
Does the public goods nature of knowledge necessarily imply a downward bias in
research activity? Dasgupta (1988) argues that it does not when ﬁrms compete
against each other.R&D activities offer ﬁrms opportunities to gain market share but
the competition for these gains can result in excessive R&D expenditures,
particularly when only one ‘winner’receives a patent.This ‘horse race’or ‘winner-
take-all’model of R&D competition demonstrates that R&D expenditures may be
allocated quite inefficiently – too much effort may be spent in the pursuit of one
innovation (although society can beneﬁt from parallel lines of research).
Dasgupta agrees with Arrow that knowledge spillovers can result in too little
innovation.Competing ﬁrms may engage in large amount of imitative research –
particularly when a patented innovation can be ‘invented around’.Imitators are
likely to face lower R&D costs.Depending on the level of competition and the
reward structure,it may be better for a ﬁrm to be an imitator than an innovator.
Gallini (1992) shows that longer patent duration can give competing ﬁrms greater
incentives to invent around a patent.Optimal patent policy is likely to provide
broad protection against imitation,with patent life chosen to generate the desired
return from R&D investment.However,broad patent protection can discourage
research that builds on or improves previous discoveries.
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and outside intervention is sometimes required to spur research effort.In general,the
experiment makes the point that a one-size-ﬁts-all patent policy is unlikely be socially
optimal.Class discussion centres on the remedies available,including changes to
patent law,direct subsidies of research,removal of barriers to collaborative research,or
the granting of prizes.This experiment is particularly well suited to courses in
intermediate microeconomics,industrial organisation,and experimental economics or
courses with a public goods policy focus,and could be combined with a research
project on R&D efforts in speciﬁc industries.A 50-minute class provides enough time
for the experiment and brief discussion.A 75-minute class allows for greater attention
to the incentive structure of the experiment and equilibrium outcomes.
Why should undergraduate economics courses give greater attention to patents?
Several recent controversies have raised questions about U.S.and world patent
policies.Pharmaceutical,software and music ﬁrms from industrialised countries
lobbied hard for the inclusion of strict intellectual property protection in the 1994
Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.The TRIPS
agreement (or Treaty on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights)
provided for universal patent recognition and a standardised 20 years of patent
protection across countries (Correa,2000).Although the agreement allowed
countries to adopt measures necessary to protect public health,39 pharmaceutical
companies ﬁled suit against South Africa in 1998 to prevent the importation or
production of generic copies of patent-protected AIDS drugs.World outrage was
captured by a March 2001 headline in the Jakarta Post:‘Millions die of AIDS just to
respect patent rights’.The public relations disaster that followed caused the
companies to drop the lawsuit in April of 2001 and resulted in a WTO agreement
allowing developing countries an additional 15-year grace period to implement
common patent policies.
Biotechnology provides other important dilemmas for patent law.Developing
countries could beneﬁt signiﬁcantly from innovations that improve agricultural
productivity but agricultural research tends to be underfunded due to large
spillover effects.Yet one solution to that problem – creating intellectual property
rights for genetically modiﬁed organisms – has created substantial problems for
poor farmers who cannot reuse seeds from the harvest (World Bank,2007).Policy
makers must search for solutions that maintain incentives for R&D while allowing
poor farmers access to new discoveries.
Patents and R&D:theory and empirical research
Policy makers have always recognised the tradeoffs inherent in the granting of
patents.In exchange for public disclosure of the innovation (so that other researchersPatents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
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The ‘winner-take-all’model of patents
Each team must decide how much research effort to put into the pursuit of a
patent on a cancer vaccine (worth $150 million to the winning ﬁrm).Each team can
allocate up to $25 million per ‘year’(in $5 million increments) for research in pursuit
of this patent.Research decisions are indicated by placing 0–5 cards in an envelope;
since each card represents $5 million of research effort,card choice indicates
research efforts of $0,$5m,$10m,$15m,$20m or $25m.These envelopes are
collected by the instructor once all teams have made their decisions.Money not
spent on research in any given year does not affect the research budget in
subsequent years:the annual research budget always has a $25 million maximum.
After the teams have submitted their research decisions,the instructor removes the
cards from the envelopes (taking care not to reveal any one team’s decision) and
counts all of the cards.The instructor records this number and announces it to the
teams.Payoffs in this experiment are uncertain and are conveyed to students
through use of a table on the student handout.
• A minimum amount of research effort must take place before a discovery is
possible.A discovery is made (and a patent awarded) only if the teams have
contributed a total of at least ﬁve cards (or $25 million in research expenditures).
If fewer than ﬁve cards are contributed,the instructor returns the cards to their
envelopes and then to the teams.The second research ‘year’begins.
• The probability of a patent award increases with the total amount of research
effort.When 5–11 cards are submitted,the instructor must roll a 1 or 2 on the die
for a patent to be awarded.When 12–16 cards are submitted,the instructor must
roll a 1,2 or 3.When 17 or more cards are submitted,the instructor must roll a 1,
2,3 or 4.
• If the roll of the die determines that a discovery has been made (and a patent
needs to be awarded),the instructor must now determine which team wins the
patent.She or he should shuffle the cards that were submitted and randomly
select one of the cards.The suit of the card determines the patent winner.The
instructor should ask teams to sum their research expenditures and winnings
(for the team that won the patent).The cards are placed in their respective
envelopes and returned to the teams.
• If there is no winner (as indicated by the roll of the die),the cards are returned to
the teams and they must decide how much to invest in additional research for
the next year.Each team can again choose to spend from $0 to $25 million (or
0–5 cards).Competition for this cancer vaccine patent continues in the same
manner until a patent is awarded.
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What are the actual effects of patent protection? In reviewing patent research,
Kremer (1998) concludes that patents result in underinvestment in R&D in general
but overinvestment in copy-cat research.Levin (1986) reports the results of a survey
of 130 R&D executives.These executives viewed patents to be most effective in
protecting competitive advantage in the chemical industry (including
pharmaceuticals).In other R&D intensive industries (such as petroleum reﬁning,
plastics,computers,communications equipment,etc.),executives ranked having a
ﬁrst-mover advantage and/or superior sales and service efforts ahead of patents as
determinants of R&D effort.Studies focused on the impact of stronger patent rights
on innovation ﬁnd little connection between the two (Sakakibara and Branstetter
2001,Hall and Ziedonis 2001).
Henderson and Cockburn (1996) ﬁnd evidence of substantial spillovers of
knowledge in the pharmaceutical industry.Large ﬁrms appear to have more
productive research programmes because they can capture some of their own
knowledge externalities (through related research in other product lines) but can
also take advantage of knowledge spillovers from other ﬁrms.In their estimates,
spillover effects enhance the research productivity of all ﬁrms.
Classroom experiment:set-up and instructions
This classroom experiment is designed to introduce students to the ways in which
the reward of a patent may result in either too much or too little R&D effort by
ﬁrms.It is fairly simple to administer (requiring only playing cards,a die and a
handout for students) but illustrates both the ‘winner-take-all’patent race model
and the case where knowledge spillovers result in signiﬁcant beneﬁts for
competing ﬁrms.It works best with classes of 8–20 students.The structure of the
experiment was inspired,in part,by the patent ‘horse race’example described by
Roger McCain (1999),in which ﬁrms invest too much in overlapping research.
From a deck of cards,remove ﬁve cards from each suit and place in envelopes that
are marked with the matching suit.(For this experiment,the exact numbers on the
cards do not matter.) Make copies of the instructions for each student (included in
the Appendix).Make sure you have a six-sided die handy.
Divide students into four small teams (with two to ﬁve students per team).Provide
the teams with enough space for private conversation about team decisions.Give
each team an envelope with cards.Carefully review all instructions for the ﬁrst part
of the experiment with students before beginning.Patents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
73
lower level of expenditures.To understand these points,it is helpful to calculate the
expected value of R&D expenditures at the ‘tipping points’of the game.With this
information (provided in Tables 1 and 2 for the winner-take-all races) students can
compare three outcomes:the experimental results from their own game play,their
‘best response’given the contributions of other teams,and the joint
proﬁt-maximising choice.
Table 1 reports expected value calculations for the ‘winner-take-all’patent race.For
any one team’s choice of 0–5 cards (across the top row),the table reports the
expected value of that choice conditional on the total number of cards contributed
by the other teams.The expected value for a team is calculated as {(probability that
a patent is awarded) * (probability that your team wins the patent) * (value of the
patent)} – research expenditure of the team,and ranges from –$20 million to $25
International Review of Economics Education
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• After the ﬁrst patent is awarded,the instructor allows the teams to begin
research on a second (entirely new) vaccine.The instructor should remind the
teams to record their decisions in the section marked ‘patent #2’on the
instruction sheet.The teams can again choose from 0–5 cards ($0 to $25 million)
of research effort.
• If patents are awarded in the ﬁrst rounds both times,the instructor may want
run the ‘winner-take-all’patent race a third time.
The spillover model of patents
Before discussing the results from the ﬁrst part of the experiment,the instructor
should now run the second part of the experiment.Here,the patent is still worth
$150 million.However,ﬁrms that do not receive the patent now receive beneﬁts
worth $130 million after the patent has been awarded.The game proceeds exactly
as described above.
Research effort may decline dramatically in the spillover section of the experiment.
It is possible that total research expenditures will fall below the $25 million
minimum and no discovery can be made.Teams with higher initial research
expenditures frequently reduce their expenditures signiﬁcantly in subsequent
rounds as they punish the free-riding attempts of the competing teams.If the
teams are unable to generate at least $25 million in expenditures after several
attempts,the instructor may choose to allow the teams 5–10 minutes to
communicate with each other or may announce a government-sponsored prize of
$30–50 million to be added to the proﬁts of the ﬁrm that makes the discovery
(therefore increasing the value of the patent to $180–$200 million).One or two
rounds are usually sufficient to make the point about decreased research effort in
the‘spillover’model.
Class discussion:winner-take-all patent race
Generally,an instructor will want to start by discussing what happened.First,in the
‘winner-take-all’patent race,did total research expenditures equal or exceed the
value of the patent in any of the patent races? Does the reward structure in this
round encourage high levels of research expenditure? What strategies did
individual teams use? What strategies did they expect other teams to use?
The experimental results illustrate several important points about winner-take-all
patent races.First,any one ﬁrm may face a strong incentive to increase its level of
R&D (particularly if the extra research expenditure crosses a ‘tipping point’of 5,12
or 17 cards).Second,if ﬁrms could cooperate on R&D,they would choose a much
Table 1:Expected value of your research expenditure choice
Number of cards played by you
Total cards played 
by others 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 –15.0 –20.0 25.0
1 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 –15.0 20.0 16.7
2 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 15.0 13.3 10.7
3 0.0 –5.0 10.0 10.0 8.6 6.3
4 0.0 5.0 6.7 6.4 4.8 2.8
5 0.0 3.3 4.3 3.7 2.0 0.0
6 0.0 2.1 2.5 1.7 –0.2 –2.3
7 0.0 1.2 1.1 0.0 –2.0 6.3
8 0.0 0.6 0.0 –1.4 5.0 3.8
9 0.0 0.0 –0.9 3.8 3.1 1.8
10 0.0 –0.5 2.5 2.3 1.4 0.0
11 0.0 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.0 –1.6
12 0.0 0.8 0.7 0.0 –1.3 4.4
13 0.0 0.4 0.0 –0.9 3.5 2.8
14 0.0 0.0 –0.6 2.6 2.2 1.3
15 0.0 –0.3 1.8 1.7 1.1 0.0
Expected value = [(Probability of award)*(Probability that you win)*(Value of patent)]
– Research expenditurePatents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
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$15 million.In this experiment,marginal increases in research effort have the effect
of increasing an individual ﬁrm’s probability of gaining a patent but do not always
increase the likelihood that a discovery is made.For example,suppose that the
opposing teams have contributed a total of four cards.If your team contributes the
ﬁfth card,joint expected proﬁts are $25 million but your own expected value is $5
million.However,you can increase the expected value of the patent for yourself by
increasing your research effort by one more card (and thus increasing the total
cards contributed to six).Expected joint proﬁts are now only $20 million but you
increase your own expected value to $6.7 million.In other words,what is privately
optimal for one ﬁrm – increasing its research expenditures relative to competing
ﬁrms – is not always optimal for the industry as a whole.
When the patent is not awarded in the ﬁrst round,the classroom experiment may
generate the result that total costs of research expenditures exceed the value of the
patent.Even if this does not occur,the research expenditures chosen by teams
routinely exceed the joint proﬁt-maximising level of expenditure.Thus,as
suggested by theory,a winner-take-all patent system has the effect of stimulating
too much research effort.
Class discussion can now turn towards the inefficiency of this outcome and realistic
examples (such as the competition among pharmaceutical companies to bring
‘blockbuster’drugs to market while diseases with lower incidences or those more
International Review of Economics Education
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million.The probability that the patent is awarded increases at discrete intervals as
the total number of cards contributed hits certain values (5,12,and 17).Any one
team’s likelihood of winning a patent depends on its own research effort relative to
the effort of other teams.Only the winning team beneﬁts from the patent award.All
other teams have negative earnings for the round.
Optimal strategy is complex and a 50-minute class will probably not provide
enough time to thoroughly discuss Nash equilibria.(To determine whether any
given card combination is an equilibrium,you must consider each of the possible
plays that could generate that combination and whether any team could change its
own contribution to make itself better off.) A team is best off when it chooses an
intensive research strategy (ﬁve cards) and all of its opponents choose to do no
research.Playing ﬁve cards is also a reasonable strategy whenever a team believes
that doing so might create an increase in the probability of a patent award (i.e.
when other teams play a total of seven or 12 cards).Once that ‘tipping’point has
been reached,however,the optimal numbers of cards played by any one team
usually decreases as other teams increase their research effort.
There are several Nash equilibria in this game.To help students understand how to
ﬁnd one,start by examining a combination that is not:all teams play ﬁve cards.For
this combination,the expected value of the patent is zero.Any team could increase
its expected reward by reducing research effort.When the total number of cards
played exceeds 17,any additional research expenditure does nothing to increase
the probability of a discovery.When each team contributes four cards,the expected
value of the patent award is –1.3.Any one team could improve its payoff by
increasing research effort to ﬁve.Thus,each team contributing four cards is not an
equilibrium outcome.However,all teams contributing three cards and all teams
contributing two cards do result in Nash equilibria.So do combinations that result
in a total of 17 cards contributed.Instructors may invite students to check their own
choices in each round (and total contributions by other teams) against the
expected value calculations in Table 1,asking whether they would have preferred a
different level of research effort in light of the decisions made by the other teams.
What is the amount of research expenditure that maximises joint proﬁts? In the
absence of externalities,this should be the expenditure effort that maximises the
probability of a discovery relative to the amount of research expenditures.Table 2
presents the joint proﬁt calculations.When ﬁve cards are contributed (for total
research expenditures of $25 million) the expected value of the research effort is
1/3 * $150 – $25 = $25 million.When 12 cards are contributed (increasing the
probability of discovery to ?),the expected value is $15 million.When 17 cards are
contributed (increasing the probability of discovery to 2/3),the expected value is
Table 2:Joint research effort
Total cards  Expected value of  Total cards  Expected value of 
played joint proﬁts played joint proﬁts
0 0 11 –5
1 0 12 15
2 0 13 10
30 1 4 5
40 1 5 0
5 25 16 –5
6 20 17 15
7 15 18 10
8 10 19 5
95 2 0 0
10 0Patents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
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terms ‘non-rival’and ‘non-excludable’and ask students for examples of goods that
ﬁt these categories.) Typically,a good bit of free-riding occurs in this round:at least
one team decides to contribute only one or even zero cards.When free-riding is
prevalent,how do ﬁrms proﬁt from discoveries?
Tables 3 and 4 report the individual and joint expected value calculations for the
‘knowledge spillover’version.Knowledge spillovers increase the joint proﬁt-
maximising level of research expenditure.The total value of a discovery is now $540
million ($150 to the winning ﬁrm and $130 to each of the other ﬁrms).For a
research effort of $25 million (ﬁve cards),the joint expected value of research is 1/3
* $540 – $25 = $155.For a research effort of 12 cards,the expected value is 
1⁄2 * $540
– $60 = $210.For a research effort of 17 cards,the expected value is 2/3 * $540 –
$85 = $275.Any one ﬁrm’s research effort which increases the probability of a
discovery increases the expected gain for all ﬁrms.
Will the actual research expenditure increase now that spillovers are present? Or
will free-riding reduce research effort? The shaded areas in Table 2 display the Nash
equilibria card combinations for this round.One set of equilibria centres around
card combinations that total 17.The best possible payoff for our hypothetical Team
A is to play two cards while each other team plays ﬁve cards.This is a Nash
equilibrium:each of the other teams has an expected value of $65.6 and cannot
increase this value with any change in card allocation.Thus,if you think all other
teams will contribute ﬁve cards,you should contribute two.However,if all teams
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prevalent in poorer countries are virtually ignored).A winner-take-all outcome may
result from patent law that provides broad protection for a long period of time.In
markets where too much effort is put into duplicative research without a
correspondingly higher social return,students can discuss whether it might be
reasonable to reduce the breadth of patent protection.Alternatively,reducing
antitrust barriers to research cooperation among ﬁrms or direct encouragement of
joint research may result in more efficient levels of research.
Knowledge spillovers discussion 
In turning discussion towards the ‘spillover’model,the instructor can begin by
asking whether knowledge is a public good and whether the requirement to reveal
the speciﬁcs of the discovery in order to obtain a patent creates positive
externalities.(Instructors who have not yet discussed public goods can deﬁne the
Table 3:Expected value of research expenditure with spillover effects
Number of cards played by you
Total cards played 
by others 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 –15.0 –20.0 25.0
1 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 –15.0 28.7 23.9
2 0.0 –5.0 –10.0 32.3 27.8 23.1
3 0.0 –5.0 36.0 31.7 27.1 17.1
4 0.0 39.7 35.6 31.2 26.7 22.0
5 43.3 39.4 35.2 30.8 26.3 21.7
6 43.3 33.1 35.0 30.6 26.0 21.4
7 43.3 39.2 34.8 30.3 25.8 44.2
8 43.3 39.1 34.7 30.1 48.3 43.8
9 43.3 39.0 34.5 52.5 48.1 43.6
10 43.3 38.9 56.7 52.3 47.9 43.3
11 43.3 60.8 56.5 52.1 47.7 43.1
12 65.0 60.8 56.4 52.0 47.5 65.6
13 65.0 60.7 56.3 51.9 69.8 65.4
14 65.0 60.7 56.3 74.0 69.6 65.2
15 65.0 60.6 78.2 73.9 69.5 65.0
Expected value with spillovers = Probability of award * [(Probability you win * value of
patent) + (Probability other team wins * value of spillover)] – Research expenditure
Table 4:Joint research effort/spillover effects
Total cards  Expected value of  Total cards  Expected value of 
played joint proﬁts played joint proﬁts
0 0 11 125
1 0 12 210
2 0 13 205
3 0 14 200
4 0 15 195
5 155 16 190
6 150 17 275
7 145 18 270
8 140 19 265
9 135 20 260
10 130Patents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
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Appendix:Student handout
R&D decisions in pursuit of a patent
Winner-take-all patent
You are the CEO of a pharmaceutical company.You have decided to pursue a patent
on a new cancer vaccine worth an estimated $150 m to your company.The vaccine is
still under development;to gain the patent,you must devote substantial research
money to the project.Researchers at three other companies are also working on this
vaccine.The likelihood that some company will make the breakthrough discovery
increases with the total amount of money devoted to research.Ultimately,only one
company beneﬁts from the patent.If your company is successful,you receive the
patent and the other companies receive nothing.If another company is awarded the
patent ﬁrst,you receive nothing for your research efforts.
Every ‘year,’your ﬁrm must decide how much effort to put into the pursuit of this
valuable patent.However,you have other research programmes as well and can
devote a maximum of $25 million per year to this particular line of research.
You have been given ﬁve cards,representing research expenditures.Each card
represents a $5 m investment in research funding and you may select any number
of cards to play.This means that in each year,a ﬁrm chooses to spend between $0
and $25 million on R&D.
Research cannot be hurried and comes with no guarantees! In each year,there is a
less than 100% probability of the vaccine.The more cards contributed by all ﬁrms
together (i.e.the greater the total research expenditure),the greater the likelihood
that one ﬁrm will be successful.
At least 1/4 of all of the available cards must be played for a patent to be awarded.
Once this threshold is passed,the leader will roll a die.If the required number is
rolled,the vaccine is patented.The experiment leader will draw from the cards
played in the round to determine which ﬁrm is the winner of the patent.The
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think the way you do,they will rationally decrease their card contributions.A
second set of Nash equilibria centres around card combinations that total 12.
Again,you are better off being the low contributor in this round:you would prefer
to contribute one card while the other teams together contribute a total of 11.
Although multiple Nash equilibria do exist and include combinations with ﬁve
cards contributed,each team has a strong incentive to free ride on the hoped-for
contributions of other teams.Ultimately,while the ﬁrms in this section of the
experiment do beneﬁt more from engaging in research,any one ﬁrm can still gain
signiﬁcant proﬁt by being an ‘imitator’rather than an innovator.
When the reward of a patent fails to encourage enough research effort,patent
policy might be changed to increase the breadth of patents.However,this change
would reduce the spillover effects (and thus public beneﬁts) of the patent.Class
discussion can turn to other options for encouraging research effort (such as
government subsidies or prizes offered by private foundations) and whether these
options provide signiﬁcantly greater public beneﬁts relative to costs.Discussion can
also cover industries in which ﬁrms prefer to maintain trade secrets rather than ﬁle
for patents (where reverse engineering is difficult) and industries in which ﬁrms rely
on gaining market share quickly,knowing that other ﬁrms will make use of the
knowledge revealed by the patent.
Concluding thoughts
This experiment provides a springboard for classroom discussion of the effects of
patents on research effort under two different incentive structures.In my
experience,the ‘winner-take-all’set-up consistently results in too much research
effort and easily promotes discussion of the possibility that the monopoly power
granted by patent protection can have more costs than beneﬁts from society’s
point of view.The ‘spillover’set-up provides a nice illustration of the public goods
aspects of knowledge and suggests that patent protection might not be enough to
encourage some types of research and development.Therefore,the standardisation
of patent law in WTO countries is unlikely to result in signiﬁcant public beneﬁts
from increased research effort.
I have enjoyed using this experiment in several different classroom settings:as part
of an intermediate microeconomics course (following coverage of monopoly),as
part of a summer seminar on experimental economics and science policy at the
National Youth Science Camp and as part of an experimental economics course.The
experiment and discussion encourage deeper thinking about an important policy
issue that does not get signiﬁcant coverage in most introductory or intermediate
economics textbooks.
Determination of awards:
Total card contributions Requirement for award of patent
Fewer than 5 cards contributed No patent awarded
5–11 cards contributed Must roll a 1 or 2
12–16 cards contributed Must roll a 1,2 or 3
17+ cards contributed Must roll a 1,2,3 or 4Patents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
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Another fresh start.You can spend up to $25 million per year for this third vaccine.
Record sheet,Patent #3
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Year Number of  Total cost of cards  Current proﬁt or loss 






Total proﬁt or loss,Patent #3
Total proﬁt or loss on all winner-take-all patent competitions:
Patents and spillover effects
Now the rules of the game change.In each round you can play cards in hopes of
winning the patent.The patent is awarded in the same way and is still worth $150
m to the winner.But once the patent is awarded,all the other ﬁrms gain important
insights they can use to advance their own research.They each receive $130 m as a
result.
Record sheet,Patent #1
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Year Number of  Total cost of cards  Current proﬁt or loss 






Total proﬁt or loss,Patent #1
Whether you won or lost the patent competition for Patent #1,you now start fresh
with a new line of research and a new budget.You can still spend up to $25 million
per year.
International Review of Economics Education
80
winning ﬁrm receives $150 m while all other ﬁrms receive $0.Thus,your chance of
gaining the patent depends on the number of cards you play,the number of cards
played by others,and the roll of the die.
If the vaccine patent is not awarded in the ﬁrst ‘year’(i.e.the roll of the die indicates
no award or there are too few cards played),ﬁrms proceed to the next ‘year’and
again need to make a decision of how much additional R&D to do in the next year,
up to $25 million.Losses are cumulative;your total expenditures from all the rounds
will be subtracted from any eventual patent award.
Once the vaccine is perfected and a patent awarded,your instructor may provide
your ﬁrm with the opportunity to conduct research on a second and possibly a third
vaccine.Since this represents a new line of research,your past research expenditures
on the ﬁrst vaccine do not enter into your calculations for the new vaccine.
Winner-take-all patent competition   Firm name:
Record sheet,Patent #1
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Year Number of  Total cost of cards  Current proﬁt or loss 






Total proﬁt or loss,Patent #1
Whether you won or lost the patent competition for Patent #1,you now start fresh
with a new line of research and a new budget.You can still spend up to $25 million
per year on R&D for this new vaccine.
Record sheet,Patent #2
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Year Number of  Total cost of cards  Current proﬁt or loss 






Total proﬁt or loss,Patent #2Patents and R&D: A Classroom Experiment
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Record sheet,Patent #2
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Year Number of  Total cost of cards  Current proﬁt or loss 






Total proﬁt or loss,Patent #2
Total proﬁt or loss on all ‘spillover effect’patent competitions:
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